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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, 19-year old Scott Hansen pled guilty to one count 
of statutory rape. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed 
and the court retained jurisdiction. On December 27, 2011, the court relinquished its 
retained jurisdiction. 
On appeal, Mr. Hansen contends that because he was not given an opportunity 
to aliocute, such constituted fundamental error, and his case must be remanded for 
resentencing. He further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district 
court's discretion because, given any view of the facts in this case and Mr. Hansen's 
life, a sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Mr. Hansen also 
contends that the fact that the district court relinquished its retained jurisdiction based 
on evidence of Mr. Hansen's performance in less than 60 days in the rider program and 
without a hearing is patently unreasonable. He further contends that the district court 
abused its discretion In failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional 
information submitted In conjunction with Mr. Hansen's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Scott Hansen was born in Spokane, Washington. (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) His mother walked out on the family shortly after 
Mr. Hansen was born, abandoning him for a life of drugs. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hansen has 
not seen his mother since, although he has made several unsuccessful attempts to 
locate her. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hansen's father married Belinda Kirk, and she was 
1 
Mr. Hansen's mother figure while he was growing up. (PSI, pp.3, 62.) Ms. Kirk had 
children from a previous relationship. (PSI, p.62.) Mr. Hansen felt that he was a 
"scapegoat" as he was the youngest child in the household. (PSI, pp.17, 62.) 
Mr. Hansen's father was verbally and physically abusive, and taught Mr. Hansen to fight 
by forcing him to fight. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Because of this upbringing, Mr. Hansen was often 
in trouble at school for fighting. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Financial resources were tight and 
Mr. Hansen often went hungry.1 (PSI, p.3.) 
When Mr. Hansen was approximately 13 years 01d,2 he was placed in foster care 
due to the physical fights between Mr. Hansen and his father, and between Mr. Hansen 
and his stepbrother. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Hansen did have a good relationship with his 
uncle,3 Tony, but Uncle Tony committed suicide in 2003, when Mr. Hansen was 
approximately 12 years 01d. 4 (pSI, p.63.) Around this time, Mr. Hansen's father was 
found to be in possession of a firearm, which was prohibited as he is a convicted felon,5 
and he was sent to prison. (PSI, pA.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen committed the 
crimes that put him in juvenile corrections in Washington State for two years. (PSI, pA.) 
Mr. Hansen was released from juvenile detention on April 14, 2010 (9/19/11 Tr., p.25, 
LsA-6), and went to live with his stepmother, Belinda, as his father was at that time 
1 Mr. Hansen reported that he would steal food from the family's kitchen because he 
didn't get enough food to eat. (PSI, p.3.) 
2 It is not clear as to whether Mr. Hansen was placed in foster care at age 13 or age 14. 
(PSI, pp.3-4.) 
3 They would spend time together collecting firewood and hanging out in the woods. 
(PSI, p.63.) 
4 Mr. Hansen was not informed of the circumstances of his uncle's death, and even at 
the time of the psychosexual and mental health evaluations, believed his uncle was 
murdered. (PSI, pp.16, 63.) Only after independent investigation was the psychosexual 
evaluator able to discover that he had committed suicide. (PSI, p.63.) 
5 Mr. Hansen's father was involved in several robberies before Mr. Hansen was born. 
(PSI, pA.) 
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incarcerated. (PSI, pp.3-4; 9/19/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-3.) Mr. Hansen tried to work as 
much as he could to help his stepmother financially; however, their already tenuous 
relationship further deteriorated, and she kicked him out of the house less than a month 
later for "arguing and not listening." (PSI, p.3.) Thereby Mr. Hansen found himself 
homeless at age 17. (PSI, p.3.; 9/19/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.10-11.) Fortunately Mr. Hansen 
went to church with a friend and met Ronald Tucker, who offered Mr. Hansen a place to 
stay. (9/19/11 Tr., p.7, LsA-5, p.29, L.19-p.31, L.2.) 
It was while residing at Mr. Tucker's house that Mr. Hansen began dating and 
having sexual relationships with the two 13-year old victims in this case. (pSI, p.29, 
Ls.19-21.) Based on this conduct, Mr. Hansen was charged with one count of statutory 
rape and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child. (R., pp.6-7.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hansen pled guilty to statutory rape and the lewd 
and lascivious conduct charge was dismissed by the prosecution. (7/21/11 Tr., p.3, 
L.22 - pA, L.16; R., ppAO-51, 61.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to 
recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, and a retained 
jurisdiction. (R., p.51.) 
On September 19, 2011, Mr. Hansen was sentenced to two years fixed, plus six 
years determinate, for a unified sentence of eight years. (R., pp.62-63.) The district 
court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.63.) During sentencing, the district court 
and Mr. Hansen's counsel made several references to both Mr. Hansen's right and his 
intent to make a statement of allocution (9/19/11 Tr., p.5, L.14 - p.6, L.2); however, he 
was never afforded an opportunity to do so. During Mr. Hansen's sentencing hearing, 
the court peppered Mr. Hansen with questions about this crime, past crimes, what he 
thought his punishment should be, and how he met the witnesses who testified on his 
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behalf. (9/19/11 Tr., p.17, LA - p.31, L.14.) Then the district court pronounced the 
sentence. (9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.32, L.9.) The district court did not give 
Mr. Hansen the opportunity to offer testimony or allocute in mitigation. 
Mr. Hansen received a unified sentence of eight years fixed with two years 
determinate, but was placed on a retained jurisdiction and arrived at the North Idaho 
Correctional Institution (NICI) on October 17, 2011. (R., pp.63, 67; PSI, p.22.) 
While at NICI, Mr. Hansen worked in the kitchen, 30 hours per week. (pSI, p.25.) 
Mr. Hansen participated in his assigned Sex Offender Assessment Group but had some 
disciplinary issues, and his case manager recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.23-27, 32.) On December 27, 2011, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction without a hearing. (R., pp.69-70.) 
Mr. Hansen filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-73.) Mr. Hansen also filed a timely Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. (R., pp.81-82.) Although Mr. Hansen submitted 
a supporting affidavit (R., pp.83-85), the motion was denied without a hearing 
(R., pp.91-95). 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Hansen's rights of due process when it did not 
allow him to allocute before he was sentenced? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Hansen following his plea of guilty to 
statutory rape? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Hansen? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hansen's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the additional 
information offered in his supporting affidavit? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
By Not Allowing Mr. Hansen To Make A Statement Of Allocution During Sentencing, 
The Court Violated Mr. Hansen's Due Process Rights 
A. Introduction 
At sentencing, the district court told Mr. Hansen that he would have an 
opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf, and Mr. Hansen's counsel advised 
the district court that he was prepared to make a statement; however, the court did not 
allow Mr. Hansen an opportunity to make a statement. Initially, the district court advised 
Mr. Hansen as follows: 
THE COURT: Before I decide what to do in this case, Mr. Hansen, I'll afford 
you an opportunity to make a statement on your own behalf or to present to me 
any evidence or information in mitigation in an effort to lessen any punishment I 
might otherwise impose. You can do that yourself, through your lawyer, through 
witnesses, or any combination of the same. 
(9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the 
district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement: "I know that my client 
does have a statement ... " (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) 
Mr. Hansen's counsel called three witnesses and presented argument. (9/19/11 
Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.26, L.6.) The district court posed several questions to Mr. Hansen 
during his counsel's argument (9/19/11 Tr., p.17, LA - p.21, L.7, p.25, LsA-6), asked 
the State what it recommended (9/19/11 Tr., p.26, L.7), posed several more questions 
to Mr. Hansen (9/19/11 Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.31, L.14), then pronounced its sentence 
(9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.33, L.1). Not once did the district court ask Mr. Hansen if he 
would like to make a statement on his own behalf prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's 
sentence. This was error, and a denial of Mr. Hansen's right to due process. 
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Before the imposition of sentence, a criminal defendant is entitled to the full 
opportunity to personally address the court before sentencing in an attempt to mitigate 
punishment. I.C.R. 33(a)(1 )6; State v. Garey, 122 Idaho 382, 386 (Ct. App. 1992). This 
is because "[s]entencing is a critical stage of the criminal process to which 
Constitutional due process guarantees apply." Boardman v. Estelfe, 957 F.2d 1523, 
1525 (9th Cir. 1992). Where a defendant is denied the opportunity to allocute, the 
proper corrective action is to remand to permit resentencing after the defendant is 
granted the right to speak. State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 479 (1976); Van Hook v. 
us., 365 U.S. 609 (1961). 
Even though Mr. Hansen did not object at the sentencing hearing, this Court is 
able to review the issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 226 (2010). To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
alleged error: "( 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Gorbus, 151 Idaho 368, 371 
(Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied. The record in this case demonstrates that the imposition 
of sentence was a fundamental error under the Perry test. 
6 Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a) requires: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak 
on behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally to ask if 
the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment. 
I.C.R. 33(a). 
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B. The Sentence Was Imposed In Violation Of Mr. Hansen's Unwaived 
Constitutional Due Process Rights 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, pre-Perry, recognized that the right of allocution was 
so important a right that a court's failure to allow a defendant to allocute constituted a 
fundamental error that could be reviewed for the first time on appeal. State v. Gervasi, 
138 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 2003). The right of allocution holds a time-honored place in 
American jurisprudence and is grounded in the fundamental truth that even the "most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, 
with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 
(1961). The record is clear that the district court did not allow Mr. Hansen a chance to 
speak. Mr. Hansen had the right to make a statement on his own behalf. 
The right of allocution is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See State v. 
Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 958 (Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing "the constitutional importance of 
the right of allocution"). In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutional 
underpinnings of the right, stating: 
Recognizing the personal nature of the 6th Amendment's guarantee of the right to 
make a defense, the unique ability of a defendant to plead on his own behalf, and 
the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the continuing vitality of the practice of 
permitting a defendant to allocute before sentencing, we hold that allocution is a 
right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution. 
Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1529-1530.7 
The purpose of allocution is to allow defendants an opportunity to mitigate their 
punishment. Goodrich, 97 Idaho at 479-80. Offering only defense counsel the right to 
speak on behalf of the accused does not constitute compliance with this rule. Id. at 480. 
7 The Ninth Circuit, in Boardman, limited its holding to those times when the defendant 
makes a request to speak to the trial court before sentencing; however, in Gervasi, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals noted that, "states are free to provide greater protections than 
those afforded at the federal level." Gervasi, at 816. 
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This rule provides the defendant "the absolute right to speak on his or her own behalf at 
sentencing." Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 591 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Clark, 146 
Idaho 483, 484 (Ct. App. 2008). Failure to allow the defendant to speak may be 
challenged on appeal as fundamental error. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. 
In Gervasi, a case decided prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Perry, 
the Court of Appeals looked at (as a matter of first impression) whether a claim of error 
based on a denial of allocution must be preserved by objection at sentencing. Id. at 
815. The Court held that even in the absence of an objection at sentencing, a 
defendant claiming a denial of the right of allocution may raise the claim either in a 
timely filed Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or 
for the first time in a timely filed appeal from the judgment and sentence. Id. at 816. 
The Court found that the proper remedy, should the defendant's right to allocute be 
denied, is a remand to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 817. 
In this case, Mr. Hansen was told prior to being sentenced that he would have an 
opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf, his counsel advised the district court 
that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement, and, although the district court posed 
several questions to Mr. Hansen during his counsel's argument, not once did the court 
ask Mr. Hansen if he would like to make a statement prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's 
sentence. 
Due to the district court's failure to allow Mr. Hansen to allocute at his sentencing 
hearing, Mr. Hansen was deprived of his right to due process of law guaranteed by the 
constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. As such, the sentence 
violated Mr. Hansen's unwaived constitutional right to due process. See Gervasi. Thus, 
the first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
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C. The Violation Of Mr. Hansen's Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious From 
The Record 
As discussed in Section I(B), supra, the district court imposed sentence without 
first allowing Mr. Hansen an opportunity to allocute. (9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.32, 
L.9.) As such, the district court's violation of those rights is clear from the record. This 
is because, as the Court of Appeals has held, "Rule 33 states that the court must 'ask if 
the defendant wishes to make a statement,' and must do this before sentencing." 
Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 817. "Further, it is not incumbent upon the defendant to 
personally interrupt, and potentially embarrass or annoy, the judge who will be 
sentencing him." Id. Thus Mr. Hansen was not required to interrupt the district court 
during his sentencing to affirmatively assert his rights. Further, this was not a tactical 
decision by Mr. Hansen's counsel. Mr. Hansen's counsel had advised the district court 
at the outset that Mr. Hansen wished to make a statement. (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) 
The district court's failure to allow Mr. Hansen to allocute is a clear and obvious violation 
of his rights. As such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 228. 
D. The District Court's Error Presumably Affected The Outcome Of The Case 
Because Mr. Hansen may have received a more excessive sentence because he 
could not offer testimony in allocution, the violation of his rights likely affected the 
outcome of his case as even the "most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for 
a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Green, 
365 U.S. at 304. 
Further, as will be discussed in more depth in Section II, infra, had the district 
court engaged in a proper sentencing determination, including proper consideration of 
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all of the mitigating factors present in Mr. Hansen's case, a more lenient sentence may 
have been imposed. 8 The record is clear that Mr. Hansen was prepared to make a 
statement that day. Although it is impossible to know precisely what Mr. Hansen would 
have said, it is likely that he would have offered mitigating testimony and demonstrated 
remorse for his crime. After hearing such testimony, the district court would have then 
applied the factors for sentencing under I.C. § 19-2521. The additional facts and 
observations that Mr. Hansen should have been allowed to set forth may have changed 
the district court's determination of the appropriate sentence for Mr. Hansen. Thus, the 
third prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
Because the district court committed a fundamental error and failed to allow 
Mr. Hansen an opportunity to allocute, this Court should vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Hansen Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Statutory Rape 
Mr. Hansen asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
8 For example, one of the mitigating factors was Mr. Hansen's youthful age and noted 
immaturity. (PSI, pp.1, 30.) 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Hansen does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Hansen must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
Mr. Hansen asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating 
factors that exist in his case. From the outset, one of the most striking facts regarding 
Mr. Hansen is his youth at the time of the alleged offense - he was barely out of his own 
childhood at about eighteen years and ten months of age. (PSI, p.1.) Although by law, 
Mr. Hansen was technically an adult, his youth coupled with a troubled childhood, noted 
immaturity, and mental health issues show that Mr. Hansen was still in many ways more 
a child than a man at the time of his offense. 
It would appear that Mr. Hansen was, himself, a victim of abuse as a child. (PSI, 
pp.3-4.) The result of that abuse was that Mr. Hansen had various disciplinary 
problems at home and in school, typically involving fighting. (PSI, pp.3-5.) Mr. Hansen 
generally suffered from a dysfunctional family life as, beginning around age 11, 
Mr. Hansen was shuffled around to family members, a foster home, and juvenile 
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detention.9 (PSI, pp.3-6.) Mr. Hansen recognized that the lack of family support and 
"bad family relationships" were problem areas that contributed to his criminal behavior. 
(PSI, p.6.) 
Adding to the impact of a tumultuous and abusive childhood, Mr. Hansen also 
suffers from serious underlying mental health conditions. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has recently recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a 
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 
(1999). When he was a child, Mr. Hansen was suicidal and made several attempts on 
his own life. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Hansen attempted suicide several times, beginning at the 
tender age of six, when Mr. Hansen tried to shoot himself with a rifle but was 
unsuccessful because he put the wrong bullet in the gun, which caused it to jam. (PSI, 
p.5.) Two more attempts were made by Mr. Hansen when he was eleven years old-he 
jumped out of a tree in an attempt to break his neck, then he attempted to suffocate 
himself by tying a bag over his head. (PSI, pp.5, 16.) Mr. Hansen began self-injuring at 
this time by making little cut marks on himself to make himself feel better. (PSI, p.16.) 
Mr. Hansen has been medicated in the past for ADHD. (PSI, pp.3, 5, 16.) While 
incarcerated in the juvenile corrections facility, Mr. Hansen was placed in housing for 
those juveniles with mental health issues. PSI, p.16.) Mr. Hansen's past diagnoses 
include Major Depressive Disorder and Borderline Intellectual Functioning. (PSI, p.16.) 
Mr. Hansen was evaluated by a licensed professional counselor prior to sentencing, and 
was found to have a mental illness-Personality Disorder, NOS, with antisocial, 
borderline and narcissistic traits. (PSI, p.20.) 
9 The district court concluded that Mr. Hansen had a "lousy upbringing." (9/19/11 Tr., 
p.33, Ls.18-19.) 
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In addition, Mr. Hansen has a minimal prior criminal record - with only two 
juvenile adjudications comprising his entire criminal history. (PSI, p.3, 6.) This absence 
of a lengthy criminal history, coupled with Mr. Hansen's youth at the time of the alleged 
offense, shows that Mr. Hansen has great potential for rehabilitation in the future. 
Mr. Hansen also asserts that the district court did not give proper consideration to 
his support in the community. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the 
Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be 
considered in the Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. 
Three members of the community testified for Mr. Hansen at his sentencing 
hearing: Ronald Tucker, James Hines and Jean Hines. (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, L.9 - 15, 
L.24.) Mr. Tucker, Mr. Hansen's landlord, testified that Mr. Hansen had been 
participating in the 12-step Celebrate Recovery program for the House of the Lord 
Church when he was arrested. (9/19/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-11, p.30, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Tucker 
said that in the two months Mr. Hansen had been participating, he had noticed positive 
changes in Mr. Hansen, which included a different outlook on life and a new "calmness 
about him." (9/19/11 Tr., p.7, L. 7 - p.8, L.7.) While residing at the home of Mr. Tucker, 
Mr. Hansen worked for Mr. and Mrs. Hines. (9/19/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.21-24, p.14, Ls.6-7.) 
His work for them so impressed the Hines' that they attended the sentencing, where 
they spoke of Mr. Hansen's potential to be rehabilitated. (9/19/11 Tr., p.8, L21 - p.15, 
L.13.) Mr. Hines found Mr. Hansen to be a hard worker; a good kid who was polite and 
eager to learn. (9/19/11 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.1 0, L.2.) Mr. Hines noted that Mr. Hansen 
needs leadership and structure. (9/19/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-3.) His wife, Jean Hines, 
agreed; she testified that Mr. Hansen wants to be part of a family-he wants guidance 
and normalcy. (9/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls16-18.) Mr. Hines testified that Mr. Hansen had 
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accepted responsibility for his actions and that prison was not the right environment for 
him. (9/19/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-25.) 
Mr. Hansen has the support of members of the community-people like 
Mr. Tucker and the Hines's want to help Mr. Hansen, because they believe in him. 
Admittedly, Mr. Hansen does not have a large supportive family to lean on, but he does 
have one family member who is still supportive of him-his grandmother. 1o They have a 
strong relationship and Mr. Hansen believes she may take him in after he is released 
from prison. (PSI, pA.) 
The psychosexual evaluator noted that Mr. Hansen was emotionally younger 
than his chronological age and therefore associated with younger peers. (PSI, p.67.) 
The Sex Offender Risk Assessment by the Department of Corrections also noted that 
Mr. Hansen was immature for his age. (PSI, p.30.) Mr. Hansen's immaturity is clearly 
highlighted in his account of the crime. He describes his relationships with both girls as 
if he and the two victims were peers. They were "hanging out" and "liking each other." 
(PSI, p.2.) "We weren't dating techinacally (sic) but we were in a way because we 
acted like it and stayed loyal to each other ... I noticed that [she] showed that she liked 
me more then just a friend, so I made the first 'move' and we kissed." (PSI, p. 2.) This 
account is not the tale of a sexual predator, but a story of an immature 18-year old, 
functioning at an emotional level much younger than his chronological age, who wrongly 
10 Previously, Mr. Hansen was estranged from his grandmother, but with the help of the 
foster family he lived with when he was 13 or 14 years old, he was able to contact his 
grandmother and re-establish their relationship. (PSI, pA.) Although Mr. Hansen and 
his grandmother were close until he was 8-years old, around this time his father 
intervened (for unknown reasons) and tried to keep Mr. Hansen from having a 
relationship with his grandmother from that point onward. (PSI, pA.) 
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believed that having a 13 or 14-year old girlfriend was appropriate. 11 Clearly this is not 
acceptable behavior under the law and Mr. Hansen was convicted of statutory rape for 
his sexual contact with one girl. Mr. Hansen knows that he made a serious mistake, but 
the fact remains that the district court dealt harshly with an immature kid. 
Mr. Hansen is not a hardened criminal. Yes, he did have a prior juvenile history. 
However, it is clear from the record that he is a very young man, immature for his age, 
and quite impressionable. For example, when the district court told him at sentencing 
that he "didn't get it,,12, Mr. Hansen agreed and parroted back to the court that he "didn't 
get it," simply because that is what the judge told him. (9/19/11 Tr., p.28, LsA-24.) 
Presumably, Mr. Hansen did not intend to be disrespectful, he probably saw the court 
as an authority figure and believed that the judge knew what was best, even when he 
disagreed with him. Prison is not the appropriate placement for Mr. Hansen, based on 
his young age, immaturity, and his ready deference to anyone he sees as an authority 
figure. 
Additionally, Mr. Hansen has expressed his remorse for committing the instant 
offense. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts' expression of remorse for his 
11 Mr. Hansen's distorted thinking regarding appropriate sexual behaviors for 13 to 14-
year olds may be based in part on his own experiences-Mr. Hansen lost his virginity at 
the age of 11 to a 16-year old girl. (PSI, p. 2.) Although the district court inquired as to 
whether Mr. Hansen felt he had been sexually molested (9/19/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-12), the 
behavior Mr. Hansen was being sentenced for also constituted seemingly "consensual" 
sexual relationships with 13-year old girls. While this does not excuse Mr. Hansen's 
conduct, it does explain his convoluted thinking about the appropriate age for sexual 
encounters and "consent." 
12 The district court was referring to a hypothetical situation in which the three witnesses 
who testified on Mr. Hansen's behalf had hypothetically had 11 to 13-year old daughters 
or granddaughters, they would not want Mr. Hansen to come to their houses when they 
were not home. (9/19/11 Tr., p.28, LsA-11.) 
16 
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other 
positive attributes of his character." !d. 121 Idaho at 204. Mr. Hansen has expressed 
his remorse for committing the instant offense, both to his counsel and to the pre-
sentence investigator. 13 (9/19/11 Tr., 26, L.1; PSI, p.6.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Hansen asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his community support, remorse, desire 
for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Hansen 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). 'The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion." State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court reviews 
the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original judgment. Id. 
at 289. 
13 Mr. Hansen did not express remorse at his sentencing as he was not allowed an 
allocution. (See generally 9/19/11 Tr.) 
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Mr. Hansen contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his limited successes during his period of retained jurisdiction, his 
recognition of a problem, and his desire to move on to a more successful future. 
Mr. Hansen recognizes that his period of retained jurisdiction was not as 
successful as desired. However, he did have some limited successes during the period 
of retained jurisdiction. There were several positive notes in his file. (pSI, pp.33, 35-
36.) Mr. Hansen volunteered to help with meal clean-up. (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Hansen also 
performed admirably in his work as a breakfast cook. (PSI, pp.35-36.) 
Based upon the above information, Mr. Hansen contends the district court 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. 
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Hansen's significant rehabilitative potential, as well as his limited 
successes while on his rider, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua 
sponte reduce Mr. Hansen's sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon 
relinquishing jurisdiction over his case. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hansen's Rule 35 Motion 
For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The Additional Information Offered in 
Mr. Hansen's Supporting Affidavit 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
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the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. 
Although Mr. Hansen contends that his sentence is excessive In light of the 
information in front of the district court at the time of his September 19, 2011 sentencing 
hearing (see Part II, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even 
more apparent in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 
motion. Mr. Hansen asserts that the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence 
modification represents an abuse of discretion. 
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Hansen submitted an 
affidavit containing information regarding his time in custody. (R., pp.83-85.) 
Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he made some bad decisions on the rider program, but 
also stated that he does care and he does want to change. (R., p.84.) Further, 
Mr. Hansen expressed remorse for his crime, and, using the skills and information 
obtained during his programming at NICI, he has realized the extent of the harm his 
actions caused to the victims. (R., p.84-85.) This demonstrates that Mr. Hansen is 
actively putting to use the information he learned from the classes at NICI. He is trying 
to use this information to better himself. 
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to reduce Mr. Hansen's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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